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Over the last two decades the world has witnessed a 
spectacular growth of investor-state dispute resolution by 
arbitration from a few dozen in 1992 shooting up to 514 
cases by the end of 2012 (see UNCTAD’s IIA Issues Note - 
“Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of 
a Roadmap” (May 28-29, 2013), at http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf).  But that 
trend could stall in the foreseeable future with the realisation 
of the users that international arbitration (investor-state 
arbitration, in particular) is increasingly becoming formalised 
and akin to be “liti-arbitration” or “arbitral litigation”, losing 
its fundamentals that make it attractive to the international 
business community. In the case of investor-state arbitration 
various issues have been raised with wider implications 
beyond the field of arbitration itself, as concerns have been 
expressed about the role of arbitrators vis-à-vis the respondent 
state’s public interest in regulating various matters including 
environmental protection, low-carbon investments, social and 
human rights, etc; dire economic consequences flowing from 
arbitrators’ decisions who lack in democratic legitimacy of a 
domestic or international judicial institution; and inconsistency 
in arbitral interpretation of investment treaty obligations, 
hence unpredictability in arbitral decisions on similar or 
identical issues. Added to this list of concerns may be the 
growing phenomenon of third-party funding of investor-state 
arbitration pushing up the costs and the increasing tendency 
of amicus briefs leading investor-state arbitration to be more 
confrontational and non-confidential (see my article on third-
party funding of international arbitration in this link:  http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/12/29/third-party-funding-
in-international-arbitration-a-menace-or-panacea/).
The adverse impact of excessive investor-state arbitral 
awards has recently prompted some resource-rich Latin 
American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela to 
withdraw from the ICSID and to intend to discard the existing 
BITs to which they are parties. Argentina has also threatened 
to do so. Australia has discarded investor-state arbitration 
in favour of its domestic courts. Various interest groups (see 
http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/)including the US State 
Legislators (see http://www.citizen.org/documents/State-Legislators-
Letter-on-Investor-State-and-TPP.pdf) have lately urged in their 
Open Letters the negotiators of the ongoing Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) to reject investor-state arbitration. One may 
wonder if there seems to be a progressive revolution in the field 
of investor-state dispute resolution.
In some recent ADR surveys in the USA, Europe and 
Asia-Pacific (eg, Cornell/Pepperdine/CPR (Fortune 1000 
corporations) (2011) , CPR survey (the Asia-Pacific Region) 
(2011)   and IMI (International Corporate Users) (January-
March 2013) it is shown that as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism mediation is increasingly attracting more 
favourable support in business for various reasons such as cost 
control, efficiency in time management, privacy, confidentiality, 
preservation of relationship, informality and flexibility. The 
phenomenon is true at both domestic and international levels. 
One survey has noted that binding arbitration has reached 
its “tipping point” (see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2221471). It is also noteworthy that the 
settlement rate of investor-state disputes at ICSID before any 
final award is rendered is estimated approximately at 30-40 
per cent. It points in the direction that there is a good prospect 
of investor-state dispute settlement by mediation which needs 
to be explored further.
In response to the growing desire to switch to non-arbitration 
ADR, namely mediation, well-known institutions such as the 
OECD and the IBA have taken the initiative to propagate such 
an alternative. Under the auspices of the OECD a series of 
symposia took place on investor-state mediation in the past 
few years and lately on October 4, 2012 the IBA adopted a set 
of rules on the subject entitled “IBA Rules for Investor-State 
Mediation” (hereinafter the IBA Mediation Rules - see http://
www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Mediation/State_
Mediation/Default.aspx ). There is more to follow from various 
other sources, national and international, in the days ahead. 
However, two principal issues may prove to be stumbling 
blocks for the progress of investor-state mediation, viz, (i) the 
failure to understand the type of mediation that is desirable 
in investor-state disputes; and (ii) the state authorities’ 
disinclination to mediation for palpable political risk (eg being 
blamed for bowing to the foreign party’s pressure or for any 
dubious deal, etc) to be faced in their country. It has to be 
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acknowledged that investor-state disputes are not the same 
as international commercial disputes nor are the mechanisms 
in which they are often settled. In the former there could be 
issues of public interest or the tax payers’ concern which is not 
the case in the latter. 
In respect of investor-state dispute settlement it may not 
always be appropriate to conduct mediation in the same style 
as in international commercial disputes. There is a garden 
variety of mediation styles such as facilitative mediation, 
evaluative mediation, deal making mediation, deal mending 
mediation, transformative mediation, settlement mediation, 
expert advisory mediation, wise counsel mediation, and 
tradition-based mediation (see Nadja Alexander, “The Mediation 
Meta Model: Understanding Practice Around the World”, 26 Conflict 
Resol Q 97 (2008)). 
Out of these varieties, as far as an investor-state dispute 
is concerned, regard must be had to the ones that cater for 
the accountability of dispute resolvers (state authority or 
representatives) to the tax payers. Evaluative mediation, which 
is often called “legal mediation”, may be closer to satisfying 
these requirements. Such mediation is right based and not 
interest based. In an evaluative mediation the third-party 
neutral looks at the disputing parties’ positional briefs and 
evaluates them objectively in light of his / her expertise to 
predict how they would fare in a legally binding decision or 
arbitration and accordingly makes suggestions to the parties 
(preferably individually in private) which accord with their 
legal rights and obligations, industry norms, or other objective 
social standards. It has, at least, a psychological effect on the 
concerned state representatives in terms of confidence-building 
that they stand upon some credible platform in respect of their 
negotiation with the foreign investor for dispute settlement. It 
may provide them with some legitimacy for their negotiation, 
hence a shield for deflecting any political criticism later on. 
It may be recalled that in the first ICSID conciliation case 
between Tesoro Petroleum Corporation and the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago1, the conciliator (Lord Wilberforce) conducted, in 
essence, evaluative mediation between the parties. The ICSID 
conciliation process thus differs from interest-based mediation 
(facilitative) but is closer to legal mediation as reflected in 
that case. However, only in a handful of cases (ie six cases 
so far) was the ICSID conciliation resorted to. The reasons 
for this least recourse to conciliation are often mentioned as: 
(i) inadequate publicity and efforts to popularize the ICSID 
conciliation mechanism; (ii) the ICSID conciliation process is 
unlike any traditional mediation (ie interest based); and (iii) 
there are fewer experts readily available for ICSID conciliation, 
etc. In order to redress these, the ICSID has lately entertained 
the idea of introducing the traditional style interest-based 
mediation in its dispute resolution system. However, the 
question remains whether traditional mediation should replace 
the ICSID conciliation mechanism (or evaluative mediation) 
for the settlement of investor-state disputes. 
It is true that often evaluative mediation in certain 
circumstances may not lead to the resolution of a dispute 
because the stronger party as evaluated, be it the state/state 
entity or the foreign investor, could be less willing to give in. 
At this juncture comes the need for assisted negotiation by a 
mediator. Thus, the mediator who has evaluated the parties’ 
positions can assist the parties to reach a “win-win” solution 
acceptable to both parties. Here is the crunch point! Having 
had their respective positions evaluated the disputing parties 
can look around to find out where their respective interests lie 
and can weigh and balance them to reach a solution themselves 
in which process the mediator can play a crucial facilitative 
role. 
For example, if the dispute is about environmental 
regulatory expropriation as the foreign investor’s cost of 
running the business runs excessively high for fulfilling the 
regulatory requirements, the state party might agree to extend 
the duration of the project by a reasonable number of years or 
by any other method to allow the foreign investor’s investment 
balance sheet in a longer term bearable. In an investment 
dispute various closely related but non-investment issues 
concerning labour, human rights, environment and climate 
change, etc, which investor-state arbitral tribunals tend to 
avoid somehow can be dealt with in mediation for the mutual 
benefit of the disputing parties.
Given the context of investor-state disputes that concerns 
public policy issues, state representatives’ accountability to 
the public or the tax payers, it may sound plausible that the 
mediator starts with the evaluation of the parties’ respective 
positions and then assists them to reach a solution to their 
disputes in their own terms. Thus, the mediator’s style could 
be described as evaluation-driven-facilitative mediation or 
evaluative-facilitative mediation (EFM). The parties need to 
provide in their contract the appropriate dispute mechanism 
in detail. However, the mediator needs to be cautious that 
throughout the process impartiality and confidentiality are 
maintained according to the parties’ wishes. 
If mediation reaches an impasse, arbitration can be resorted 
to as a fallback (ie Med-Arb) with the same person as the 
mediator and arbitrator or a different person as the arbitrator 
as the parties might agree. It should be mentioned that this 
process should be a structured and sequential one, given the 
fact that the state party needs to get its position evaluated for 
its public accountability purposes (at least for its confidence’s 
sake) before it can explore an interest-based resolution (ie 
facilitative mediation) of the dispute with its counterparty. 
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It is noteworthy that the aforementioned IMI survey 
(http://imimediation.org/imi-international-corporate-users-adr-
survey-summary) finds a wide support (in respect of dispute 
resolution generally) for evaluative mediation and for more 
proactive encouragement from arbitration tribunals and the 
courts to incorporate mediation into litigation and arbitration 
proceedings. Such a mechanism (Med-Arb) can be adopted by 
the disputing parties under the IBA Mediation Rules. Serious 
considerations may be given to include it in a new generation 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
Last but not least, for credible and successful investor-
state mediation, apart from the subject-matter expertise of 
the mediator along with other well-perceived qualities, the 
representation on the state-party side by its some heavyweight 
(professional or political) and popular figure in high-value or 
complex cases could be a plus. 
1 See 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qlf_RRrWZ_QC&pg=PA399&lpg=PA
399&dq=Tesoro+Petroleum+Corporation+and+the+Government+of+
Trinidad+and+Tobago&source=bl&ots=a3xHe_CEdT&sig=a6l5JcdH3E
6VATfAsR3EAsSb_Vg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qpKlUbuyF- 
mL0AWkiYDgBA&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Tesoro%20
Petroleum%20Corporation%20and%20the%20Government%20of%20
Trinidad%20and%20Tobago&f=false
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